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The Norwegian Spring-Spawning





Abstract  This paper presents an empirically based, game-theoretic model of
the exploitation of the Norwegian spring-spawning herring stock, also known as
the Atlanto-Scandian herring stock. The model involves five exploiters; Norway,
Iceland, the Faroe Islands, the EU, and Russia and an explicit, stochastic mi-
gratory behavior of the stock. Under these conditions Markov Perfect (Nash)
equilibrium game strategies are calculated and compared to the jointly optimal
exploitation pattern. Not surprisingly, it turns out that the solution to the com-
petitive game is hugely inefficient, leading very quickly to the virtual exhaustion
of the resource. The scope for cooperative agreements involving the calculation
of Shapley values is investigated. Although the grand coalition of all players
maximizes overall benefits, such a coalition can hardly be stable over time un-
less side payments are possible.
Key words  Fisheries economics, fisheries game theory, high-seas fishing, mi-
gratory fish stocks, multi-nation fisheries games, natural resource extraction
games.
Introduction
The Norwegian spring-spawning (Atlanto-Scandian) herring stock is potentially one
of the largest and biologically most productive fish stocks in the world. During the
early 1950s, its total biomass ranged between 15 and 20 million metric tons (MT),
and its spawning stock averaged 10 million MT (Patterson 1998; Bjørndal et al.
1998). Although annual catches during the 1950s were in excess of 1 million MT,
average fishing mortality was usually less than 0.1.
In the 1960s, new harvesting technology, involving sonar and the powerblock,
led to greatly increased exploitation of the stock. Several European fishing nations
participated in the fishery with Norway, Iceland, and the USSR being the most
prominent. In the late 1960s, the stock suffered a collapse apparently due to a com-
bination of overfishing and deteriorating environmental conditions. In spite of a
moratorium on fishing from the spawning stock imposed in 1969, the stock contin-
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ued declining reaching a nadir of 71,000 MT and a spawning stock of 2,000 MT in
1972 (Patterson 1998). Since then, the stock has recovered and the current spawning
stock is now close to its previous size of 10 million MT.
The Atlanto-Scandian herring is highly migratory. The adult stock spawns off
western Norway in February to April (see map in figure 1). After spawning, the
adult stock embarks on feeding migrations westward and northward following the
zooplankton blooms across the North Atlantic. The feeding period normally ends in
September, at which time the stock commences migrations to its wintering area.
There, the adult stock stays until January each year when it migrates to the spawn-
ing grounds off western Norway.
Although the above describes the essential features of the Atlanto-Scandian
herring’s migratory pattern, the exact migratory routes and distances have been
somewhat variable. Although not fully understood, it appears that this migratory
variability depends primarily on two factors: (i) spawning stock size and (ii) envi-
ronmental conditions, especially the availability of feed and ocean thermoclines. A
stylized migratory pattern based on the migratory behavior for a sizeable spawning
stock is illustrated in figure 1.
It is primarily during the feeding migrations from May to September each year
that the Atlanto-Scandian herring becomes subject to international fishing pressure.1
On leaving the Norwegian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the herring enters in-
Figure 1. The Atlanto-Scandian Migratory Routes:
National EEZs and the Herring Loophole
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ternational waters (the herring loophole, see figure 1). It then enters one or more of
the EEZs of the Faroe Islands, Jan Mayen (Norway), and Iceland. During this pe-
riod, the herring tends to form dense schools that are particularly suitable for purse-
seine fishing. In the herring loophole, access to the stock is basically open to all.
This is followed by sequential, but somewhat stochastic, exclusive national access
by the three countries with adjacent EEZs: Iceland, the Faroe Islands, and Norway.
This obviously defines a fairly intricate game-theoretic situation. First of all, the
game is dynamic or evolutionary, in the sense that the opportunities (or moves)
available to each player depend on the size of the stock and, consequently, his
moves and those of the other players in previous time periods. Secondly, over the
course of the year, the set of moves available to each player depends on the location
of the stock. Thus, if the stock is located within a country’s EEZ, the other players
do not have access to it and are reduced to the role of observers. Thirdly, any coop-
erative agreement the players may manage to arrange is potentially threatened by:
(i) the entry of new players wanting to take advantage of a growing stock and (ii)
altered migratory behavior of the herring, which will change the respective national
threat-points and may render the existing cooperative sharing untenable.
In recent years, a number of fishing nations have participated in the Atlanto-
Scandian herring fishery. The most important of these are Norway (about 60% of the
total harvest), Iceland (about 15%), Russia (about 11%), EU nations2 (about 8%) and
the Faroe Islands (about 5%). A few years ago, these nations agreed on setting and
sharing an overall quota in this fishery. The agreed quota shares are roughly in con-
formance with recent historical catch shares. This agreement, however, is not in-
tended to be permanent; in particular, the quota shares are periodically renegotiated.
Given the high likelihood of altered migratory behavior of the stock and the possi-
bility of new entrants, it is unclear how stable this agreement can be.
Our intention is to study the fisheries game situation in which the exploiters of
Atlanto-Scandian herring fishery find themselves. Our approach is to devise a
simple model of the situation based on the measurable realities of the fishery. Since
the model is quite simple and its key relationships imperfectly estimated, we prefer
to refer to this model as a stylized portrayal rather than an empirical model. Subse-
quently, on the basis of this stylized model, we seek equilibrium strategies for each
of the players under a variety of competitive and cooperative situations and study
the implications for the fishery. Although designed for the Atlanto-Scandian herring
fishery, our modelling framework is quite general and can, with little modification,
be used to study multi-player, migratory fisheries games in general.
Theory
Considerable research has been conducted on the strategic aspects of the exploita-
tion of fish stocks (Clark 1976; Levhari and Mirman 1980; Hannesson 1993).
Kaitala (1986) provides a survey of the use of game theory to analyze the exploita-
tion of fish stocks prior to 1986. This paper studies the special situation of strategic
interaction where the fish stocks are strongly migratory.
We regard the situation as a game between various fishing agents, each of whom
is trying to maximize the present value of their net returns. We describe the evolu-
tion of the game in terms of Markov perfect equilibria and utilize recently devel-
oped methods for analyzing such equilibria, examples of which can be found in
Ericson and Pakes (1995), Pakes and McGuire (1994), Pakes (1994), and Rust
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(1994, 1996). According to these methods, the agents select decision rules that pre-
scribe their reaction to changes in the state variables; in this case, the size of the fish
stock and its location. Furthermore, each decision rule gives a best response to the
decision rule of all the other agents. Agents’ controls are usually either fishing effort
or the amount of biomass caught. The setup is general enough to allow for more
state variables, such as several species and cohorts and more than one control per
agent. However, computational limitations may prevent the implementation of these
extensions. The Markov perfect equilibrium assumption means that agents cannot
commit themselves for extended periods.3 When coalitions are introduced, it will be
assumed that coalitions do not cooperate with each other or with single players.
Coalition agreements are assumed to be binding.4
Our particular setup focuses on the importance of the migratory behavior of fish
stocks and, in particular, whether a fish stock, at some point in time, is located
within the EEZ of a particular country or in high seas. Authors that have introduced
EEZs or other ways of ensuring the excludability of potential exploiters include
Fischer and Mirman (1994), Kennedy (1987), Kennedy and Pasternak (1991),
Krawczyk and Tolwinsky (1993), and Naito and Polasky (1997).
In addition to finding the (competitive) Markov perfect equilibrium, we also
calculate the jointly optimal solution. No attempt is made to model how the jointly
optimal solution could be implemented, except by calculating Shapley values
(Shapley 1953). Several authors, including Kaitala and Pohjola (1988), have looked
at the possibility of side payments to support a solution that is a Pareto improvement
on the competitive outcome.
The Basic Model
We are concerned with modelling the harvesting from a migratory fish stock by
more than one exploiter (nation).5 Compared to the usual bioeconomic fisheries
models, this implies two additional features: (i) variable catchability depending on
the location of the stock at each point of time, and (ii) strategic behavior by each of
the exploiters of the stock.
The following equations represent the essential structure of our model:
Biomass Growth
xx G x y tt t t
i
i
−= − −− ∑ 11 () (1)
where x represents the size (biomass) of the fish stock, y is the catch, t denotes time,
and the index, i, refers to the different exploiters. The function G(.), of course, rep-
resents the natural growth of the biomass.6
3 Reinganum and Stokey (1985) look at the importance of the period of commitment when extracting a
common resource in an oligopolistic setting.
4 The stability of coalitions is briefly discussed in the section on game outcomes.
5 It is possible to set up a model where players are individual vessel owners instead of nations. This was
not done for several reasons. One reason is practical; the solution algorithm will quickly bog down if the
number of players is too high. More importantly, it is more natural to think of nations as players in a
game like this where EEZs are of paramount importance.
6 In principle, it is possible to employ cohort disaggregated growth functions. This, however, is
computationally much more demanding.Herring Fisheries Games 297
Harvesting Costs
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where dt represents the distance from the base of the exploiter to the centre of the
fish stock at time t. More specific assumptions on the effect of the three variables,
catches, stock size, and distance on cost will be introduced later.
Migrations and the Location of Fish Stock
Several modelling assumptions are possible, but to keep the presentation reasonably
simple, let us initially assume that the fish migrate in a deterministic fashion, so that
location in each period is a function of the location in the previous period. A more gen-
eral stochastic type of migrations is discussed in the section on Model Extensions.
Let lt = (ll t
x
t
y , ) represent the location of the stock at time t, where x denotes the
x-coordinate and y denotes the y-coordinate of the location. Then a simple, deter-
ministic presentation of migrations is given by the differential equation:
lL l tt + = 1 () (3)
Location of Exploiters
It seems plausible to assume that the exploiters operate from a number of fixed ports
or locations  ˆ li. Note that, in principle, each country may have fleets operating out of
different ports so that the number of these locations may exceed the number of na-
tional exploiters. The exploitation pattern may, and presumably will, shift over time
as the fleets embarking from each exploitation point vary between zero and a posi-
tive number over time.
Distance from Exploiter to the Centre of the Fish Stock
Ignoring the curvature of the globe (which is reasonable for relatively short dis-
tances), we represent the distance between the ports of exploiter i and the location of
the stocks by the expression:
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Prices
We provisionally assume that all prices including the price of landed fish, p, and the
discount factor, β ,7 are constant. This assumption is easy to relax.
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In order to facilitate the appreciation of the method employed to obtain explicit nu-
merical solutions to the migratory fisheries game, it is useful to first consider rela-
tively simple game situations. In the section on Model Extensions, we extend the
model to include stochastic migrations and the restrictions imposed by EEZs.
Case 1:  One Exploiter
First, we will consider the situation of one exploiter referred to as exploiter i. In this
situation, presumably, the exploitation of the stock will be optimal (given the loca-
tion of this exploiter).
The problem for one exploiter is easily solved using dynamic programming. In
particular, note that the net present value of future profits can be split into two parts,
the profits this year and the present value of all future profits, as follows:
˜ (,) ˜ (,) ΠΠ Π it t t
i
it t xl x l =+ ⋅ ++ β 11
It is important to note that this system has two state variables; the size of the
fish stock and its location. Profits will be a function of these two variables. To maxi-
mize the net present value of profits, exploiters will have to find the optimal catch,
given the size of the fish stock and its location. Mathematically:
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t xl yxl X xy l l
tt
i =+ ⋅ [] {} ≥≥0 β
This is a straightforward contraction mapping that can be solved numerically with
the help of a computer. The form of Π  is known, given the above equations for cost,
distance, and the price of fish. The forms of the X and l functions are also known.
The only unknown is thus  ˜ Π . This can be found by iterative techniques. We start
with a guess for  ˜ Π  on the right-hand side and use that to compute the  ˜ Π  on the left-
hand side. The guess for the left-hand side  ˜ Π  is then used as a guess for the right-
hand side  ˜ Π , and a new guess for the left-hand side  ˜ Π  found. This is repeated until
the  ˜ Π ’s on the left- and right-hand sides are deemed sufficiently similar. A Fortran
program has been written that performs these calculations.8
8 The program is available from the authors upon request. Contact gylfimag@hi.is for details.Herring Fisheries Games 299
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To maximize profits, the harvesting activity should be concentrated in the pe-
riod when the stock is closest to the home port of the exploiter. This rule is, in gen-
eral, modified by capacity constraints (in this paper no capacity constraints are as-
sumed) and the discount rate.
Case 2:  Two or More Exploiters That Cooperate
This is a straightforward extension of Case 1. The only change is that the relevant
profit function is now the sum of the two exploiters’ individual profit functions, and
there are two locations and harvests to maximize over. Consequently, essentially the
same method as in the single exploiter case can be used to solve this problem. Hav-
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Case 3:  Two or More Exploiters that Compete
The simplest assumption is that each exploiter takes the decision rule (Γ i(xt, lt); i.e.,
catch as a function of stock size and the location of the stock) of his opponents as
given and chooses his decision rule without taking into account that his choice of
decision rule may affect the choice of a decision rule by the other exploiter.9 In ef-
fect, this means that exploiter 1 behaves as if the growth function for the stock is:
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Exploiter 1 then finds his optimal decision rule, Γ 1, given this “growth” func-
tion. We have found an equilibrium if each Γ i’s is the best response to all the other
decision rules (Γ j’s). This is referred to as a Nash equilibrium of the competitive
game (Nash 1951).
To calculate this, we need a somewhat more complicated process than in Cases
9 The decision rule is sometimes referred to as the reaction function. The assumption that players take
the decision rules of other players as given is quite widely used, but one could also attempt to model
players that try to affect the decision rules of each other.Arnason, Magnusson, and Agnarsson 300
1 and 2. For the two-exploiter game, we start with any decision rule for exploiter 2.
One possibility might be the decision rule for exploiter 2 if he were the sole ex-
ploiter. Given this, we solve the problem for exploiter 1 in the same way as in Case
1, but using the new “growth function;” i.e., equation (4), given above. This yields
his decision rule; i.e., Γ 1(xt, lt). Then, we use this decision rule to find the optimal
decision rule for exploiter 2 and so on. This process is repeated until it converges;
i.e., the changes in the two decision rules between iterations are deemed sufficiently
small. This represents the Nash equilibrium of the game.
With more than two exploiters, n, say, we start with any set of n – 1 decision
rules. On this basis, we find the decision rule for the nth exploiter, then the decision
rule for exploiter number n – 1, given the initial guess for the first n – 2 exploiters
and the one calculated for exploiter n. This is repeated until we have found a deci-
sion rule for all exploiters. We then start with the n-th exploiter again and repeat the
process until it converges in the sense that the changes in each exploiter’s decision
rule between iterations are arbitrarily small.
The computational requirements of the problem obviously increase very fast
with the number of competing exploiters. Several exploiters also make it much more
difficult to analyze and explain the outcome. The computer program that has been
developed, however, is quite general and will, in theory, work for any number of ex-
ploiters. The computational requirements, however, limit the number of exploiters
that can be practically dealt with.
Case 4:  Coalitions That Compete
This case is a straightforward combination of Case 2 (cooperation) and Case 3
(competition). From the viewpoint of the other players (single players or coalitions),
each coalition acts as a single player. The only change is in the cost function. A coa-
lition has a cost function that is based on the cost functions of all its members as in
Case 2. Having found the cost functions for the various coalitions, the game is
played and simulated in the same way as in Case 3 (for any number of coalitions and
single players).
The establishment of coalitions, decisions whether to join one or not, and
whether to join a coalition and not adhering to its strategy are, of course, games in
and of themselves. This paper is not concerned with modelling this aspect of the
strategy of high-seas fisheries.
Model Extensions
The basic migratory model described above may be extended in various ways. For
the purposes of describing the Atlanto-Scandian herring fishery, the following addi-
tions have been adopted:
Stochastic Migrations
The actual migrations of the Atlanto-Scandian herring are not very regular. They are
more properly regarded as stochastic movements around an expected path. Stochas-
tic migrations call for a relatively minor change in the theoretical setup described
above, at least if we assume that the set of points that the fish can swim to is
bounded. The computational requirements, however, increase drastically.
Under uncertainty, it is natural to assume that exploiters will want to maximizeHerring Fisheries Games 301
the expected value of future profits.10 We need to model the migrations of the stock;
i.e., we need some function that describes the probability distribution over the
stocks’ location next period as a function of the location this period (and perhaps
other factors, such as the stock size). More precisely we seek:
pl l l tt () *
+ = 1
where
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The changes stochastic migrations require for the profit maximization setup in
Case 1, above, are given by the following expression. The changes needed for the
other cases are analogous:
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Clearly, the solution method does not change in principle, but the computational
burden (involving integration over probabilities) may be considerably greater.
The simulations for the Atlanto-Scandian herring game that are described later
in this paper, are based on stochastic migrations along these lines. The transition
function that is used for the simulations generates stochastic migration within the
boundaries of a box, but with a tendency to move from one quadrant of the box to
another in a somewhat circular fashion. The function was also designed so that
points near the centre of the box are chosen with a higher probability than points
close to the boundaries.
Exclusive Economic Zones
The existence of EEZs means that some fishing areas may be off bounds for a par-
ticular exploiter. This does not call for major alterations to the theoretical setup,
only the choice set of the exploiters changes. Theoretically, this is of minor impor-
tance (provided the opportunity set does not become too convoluted), although it
may render the numerical search for a maximum more difficult. Below, we provide
the appropriate maximization set up for the case of one exploiter (Case 1, above).
The changes in the maximization set up for the other cases are analogous:




tt i t t
i
t xl yxl X xy l l
t
i
tt =+ ⋅ [] {} [] ∈ β
where
















0  if 
) if  0
where Ei represents what we refer to as the accessible zone for exploiter i. The ac-
cessible zone normally includes the exploiter’s EEZ and the high seas. In some
cases, the accessible zone may include parts or all of another exploiter’s EEZ. Note
that accessible zones generally overlap. Thus, the high seas would normally be
within the accessible zones of all exploiters. The Ω  function simply says that if the
stock is located within the accessible zone of a player, he can catch anything be-
tween zero and the whole stock, but if the stock is not located in the accessible zone
of a player, the player cannot catch at all.
Empirics
In addition to the migrations of the herring, described above, the empirical content
of the model consists of the specification and estimation of the biomass growth and
cost functions specified in equations (1) and (2), above.
A simple specification of biomass growth corresponding to equation (1) is given by:
() xx yr x
K




 −− − 11 1 1
1 γ (5)
where xt denotes the biomass of the resource at time t, and yt the total harvest, and r,
K, and γ are parameters. When γ = 1, this equation represents the well-known logis-
tic growth function in which case r and K represent the so-called intrinsic growth
rate and carrying capacity of the stock, respectively (Clark 1976).
Using annual data on spawning stock size and harvest for the Norwegian spring-
spawning herring during the period 1950–95, equation (5) was estimated. The esti-
mation equation is:
() xx y x x tt t t t −+ = + −− − 11 1 2 1
3 ββ
β
where β 1 = r, β 2 = r/K  and β 3 = γ + 1.
Results from estimating the parameters of equation (5) are presented of table 1. Col-
umn two presents the results of a nonlinear least squares estimation of all three param-
eters simultaneously. This procedure yields an estimate of β 3 = 2.07 (γ = 1.07). As
this value is very close to and seemingly statistically indistinguishable from 2, the
parameter β 3 is restricted to be equal to 2 in the subsequent regressions reported in
the next three columns.
According to the results reported in column three in table 1 (headed NL2), re-
stricting β 3 = 2 does not appear to be contradicted by the data. In fact, the two esti-
mated parameters, β 1 and β 2, now seem to be statistically more significant than be-
fore. The corresponding intrinsic growth rate of the biomass, r, is now about 0.47
(47%). Interestingly, this is very close to the corresponding estimate of the intrinsic
growth rate of North Sea herring of 0.52 reported by Bjørndal (1998). The implied
carrying capacity of the biomass (spawning stock), about 9.4 million MT, is very
close to the actual biomass size in the 1950s.
It may be noted that lagged values of the herring stock appear both as a part ofHerring Fisheries Games 303
the dependent variable and as explanatory variables on the right-hand side of ex-
pression (5). Moreover, estimates of the herring stock are subject to measurement
errors. Both may lead to inconsistent estimates of the parameters reported in col-
umns 2 and 3 of table 1. These problems may be bypassed by using suitable instru-
ments for the two herring stock variables. The results of doing this are reported in
columns 4 and 5 in table 1. In column 4, headed IV-1, lagged values of the annual
catch were used. In column 5, headed IV-2, second lags of the herring stock were
used as instruments.
None of the procedures employed to estimate equation (5) yields a seemingly
valid statistical description of the data generating process. All fail one or more of
the diagnostic checks reported. In particular, according to the Jarque-Bera test, the
assumption of normally distributed error terms is consistently rejected. Similarly,
according to the White test, three of the estimates appear to be plagued by
heteroskedasticity. Both of these results may be regarded as an indication of func-
tional misspecification. This is not surprising, as it is well known that the
aggregative biomass growth function can only be regarded as an approximation to
the real population growth process. One of the implications is that the parameter es-
timates reported and the usual tests for their significance are unreliable. In spite of
this, estimates of equation (5) may be acceptable for forecasting purposes. For this
purpose, we have chosen to use the NL2 estimation results.
In addition to the biomass growth function, we require estimates of the harvest-





i (, , )  for the different players. The available data consist
of annual observations on the operations, costs, and harvests of several Icelandic
and Norwegian herring fishing vessels during the 1990s. Since this data set does not
include distances to the fishing grounds and is on an annual basis, it is of limited
help in this study. This work is concerned with the annual cycle of migrations and
the consequent variable distance from port to the fishing grounds within the year.
Our recourse is to construct what may be called a technical or engineering type of a
costs function for this fishery that is consistent with the available data.
Examination of the available cost data suggests that vessel costs may be divided
Table 1
Estimates of the Biomass Growth Function, Equation (5),
for the Norwegian Spring-spawning Herring
NL1 NL2 IV-1 IV-2
 β1 0.45387 0.47093* 0.29910 0.48549*
(0.40377) (0.11499) (0.39100) (0.15566)
 β 2 –0.00003 –0.00005* –0.00002 –0.00006*
(0.00033) (0.00001) (0.00006) (0.00002)
 β 3 2.06884 2 2 2
(1.26294)
 (Implied) K  15,129  9,418.6  14,955  8,091.5
  R 2 0.146 0.163 0.073 0.296
 BG 4.528 1.600 0.301 13.868*
 White 11,528* 6,779* 31,707* 2,129
 Jarque-Bera 19,159* 19,108* 31,341* 20,736*
Notes: Dependent variable measured in 1,000 MT; standard errors in parentheses. R2is the adjusted R2,
BG represents the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier test for serial correlation, here second-order
correlation, White, the White test for an unknown form of heteroskedasticity and Jarque-Bera represents
the Jarque-Bera test for normally distributed residuals. *denotes that the parameters or tests are signifi-
cant at the 1% level of significance.Arnason, Magnusson, and Agnarsson 304
into four main categories: (i) the crew share and similar costs that are a fraction of
the value of landings; (ii) vessel sailing costs to and from the fishing grounds de-
pending primarily on the distance travelled; (iii) the flow of fixed costs, which de-
pends on the length of the period in question; and (iv) other fixed costs (a sort of
set-up costs), which are independent of the length of the period.
On this basis, we may write the cost function as:
cy Td p y T d h i(, , )=κλ ⋅⋅+⋅+⋅⋅⋅+ ∆Φ 2 (6)
In this expression, the variables are as follows: y is the volume and p the price of
landings, so that p·y represents the gross value of landings. T is the length of the
fishing season. d is the distance to the fishing grounds, and h is the number of fish-
ing trips, so that 2·d·h is the total distance travelled. Φ represents fixed costs. The
parameters are κ, ∆, λ, and Φ. κ is the fraction of the value of landings that repre-
sents costs to the operation. The crew share is normally, by far, the largest part of
this cost. ∆ is the fixed cost (more or less) per vessel per day at sea. This consists of
various items of which vessel and crew maintenance, crew salary, vessel insurance,
and fishing operational costs are among the most significant. λ is the cost per mile
of distance travelled. The most prominent of this cost is fuel consumption. Finally, Φ
represents the fixed costs not attributable to any of the variables of expression (6).
Now, the number of trips, h, during a season of length T depends on a number of




















where a is the daily rate of harvest when the vessel is on the fishing grounds; b is
the proportion of each season spent in harbor due to repairs, bad weather, etc.;  y  is
the hold capacity of the vessel; s is the sailing speed (in miles/day) of the vessel;
and e is the landing time per trip. T and d, it will be recalled, represent the season
length and the distance, respectively.
Combining equations (6) and (7) yields the vessel cost function as:



























It is important to realize that this cost function, equation (8), does not explicitly
include the biomass of the stock, x.11 This is in conformance with empirical results
(Bjørndal 1987; Agnarsson, Arnason, and Magnusson 1999) and reflects the fact that
herring is an extreme schooling species; therefore, the harvest is largely independent
of the stock size.
Now, the fishing technology of all five players engaged in the Atlanto-Scandian
11 It could, of course, be included as one of the arguments determining a, the rate of harvest (see the
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herring fishery is similar. They all use standard, large-boat purse seine fishing tech-
nology.12 Hence, it stands to reason that the technological parameters of equation (8)
are very similar. On the basis of technical information, the values for parameters are
shown in table 2.
Obviously, inserting these technical parameters values in equation (8) yields a
linear cost function in three variables, p·y, T, and d, and four unknown parameters,
κ, ∆, λ, and Φ. This equation is, in principle, estimable. The problem, however, is
that the available data has T of one year and no observations on d, the distance, at
all. Therefore, with our data set, it is not possible to estimate equation (8) directly.
Our approach was to select values for the parameters of equation (8) on technical
and accounting grounds. The values in table 3 were employed.
While this approach is somewhat arbitrary, it may be indicative of its appropri-
ateness that by setting the season length at 360 days and selecting values for the dis-
tance, d, from within a plausible interval, it was possible to obtain a very good fit to
the available vessel cost data.13 It should be noted, however, that this is not much of
a test, because varying d within plausible bounds allows us to span quite a wide cost
range. Basically, it just shows that this constructed cost function is not contradicted
by the data.
A cost function based on equation (8) is a bit too cumbersome to be practical in
simulations. Therefore, we elected to use this function to generate cost data for each
quarterly season (91 days) and a wide range of distances and harvests. More pre-
cisely, we generated the data on the basis of equation (8) as follows:
12 This does not apply to the Norwegian inshore fishing of immature herring—that fishery is not in-
cluded in our international spawning herring fishery game.
13 When d was allowed to vary within a reasonable range for each individual vessel, the fit was virtually
perfect (R2 = 0.99999). With identical d for all the Icelandic and another one for all the Norwegian ves-




Catch rate, a MT per day 500
Maintenance time, b Fraction 0.1
Hold capacity,  y MT 1,000
Vessel speed, s Miles per day 240




Crew share and similar, κ Fraction 0.35
Operating time cost, ∆ M.ISK/day 0.1
Distance costs, λ M.ISK/mile 0.0001
Annual fixed costs, Φ M. ISK 150Arnason, Magnusson, and Agnarsson 306


























For T = 91 and y and d in the range y ∈  [1,000, 50,000] d ∈  [10, 1,500].
The resulting data series, 1,155 data points, were used to estimate (by OLS) a
cost function of the following form:
cyd y d (, ) () () =⋅ ⋅ α α α
1
2 3 (9)
It turned out that this function provided a very good fit to these generated data (R2 =
0.99997). Hence, we conclude that we may employ equation (9) as a reasonable ap-
proximation to the theoretically more appropriate cost function defined by equation (8).
This cost function applies to individual vessels, but our players in the Atlanto-
Scandian fisheries game are nations. These players make their moves by selecting
national harvest quantities. Therefore, we have to establish a relationship between
the number of vessels and the national harvest quantity. Catch per vessel is defined
by the identity:
ya T f =
where Tf represents the time fishing, and a, it will be recalled, is the rate of harvest.


















Denoting the national harvest by Y, the number of vessels needed to take that harvest






























Multiplying equation (9) by this number of vessels finally yields the aggregate na-
tional costs.
Games: Simulating the Exploitation of Atlanto-Scandian Herring
Here, we employ the model outlined in the Theory and Empirics sections to explore
the possible outcomes of the harvesting game for the Atlanto-Scandian herring fish-
ery. A further description can be found in Arnason, Magnusson, and Agnarsson
(2000).Herring Fisheries Games 307
Extreme Schooling and Optimal Equilibrium
Before proceeding, it may be helpful to briefly consider a somewhat peculiar aspect
of this model compared to more conventional fisheries models. This is the feature
that the stock of fish does not enter the player’s profit functions. This is in accor-
dance with the theory of extreme schooling species (Clark 1976; Bjørndal 1987). An
extreme schooling species forms schools of roughly equal density irrespective of the
size of the stock. Hence, the size of the stock only affects the number of schools and
perhaps their average size. With modern technology, schools of pelagic species, such
as herring, are relatively easy to locate. Moreover, purse seiners usually harvest a
small part of one school. It follows immediately that the catchability of an extreme
schooling species is largely independent of the stock size, provided, of course, the
stock is large enough to form schools of reasonable size. This means that the elastic-
ity of output with respect to stock size is zero, or at least close to negligible, as long
as catches are (considerably) smaller than the stock size.
The Atlanto-Scandian herring is an extreme schooling species. Hence, it is to be
expected that the stock size does not play a role in the profit function of the harvest-
ing process (provided the stock is big enough to form schools). Indeed, empirical in-
vestigations broadly support this hypothesis (Agnarsson 1999; Agnarsson, Arnason,
and Magnusson 1999; Bjørndal 1987).
Optimal harvesting programs for extreme schooling species are particularly
simple. For instance, provided the harvesting capacity is sufficiently high, it is easy
to show that a profit-maximizing equilibrium is given by the simple expression:
Gx(x) = r
where G(x) is the biomass growth function. In our case, using the biomass growth
parameters of from the Empirics section and a discount rate of 5% per annum, the
optimal equilibrium biomass of the Atlanto-Scandian herring stock is found to be
approximately 4.209 million metric tons (MT). This is presumably the equilibrium
biomass level to which a cooperative game solution would converge. Of course,
with variable distance, full equilibrium is not attainable. In that case, we would ex-
pect the optimum biomass path to converge to a regular cyclical pattern with an av-
erage in the neighborhood of 4.209 million MT.
The Game Setting




Player 4, the Faroe Islands
Player 5, EU countries
We take it for granted that each of these players seeks to maximize his expected
economic returns (expected present value of profits) from the fishery. The strategy
space open to each player is his harvesting quantity. More precisely, he can choose
any positive level of harvesting bounded only by availability of fish. The game is a
quarterly game. This means that each player makes his harvesting choice once every
quarter. The players are assumed to have identical profit functions (defined in theArnason, Magnusson, and Agnarsson 308
Empirics section).14 They differ, however, in terms of their location and the section
of the herring’s possible migratory routes covered by their EEZs. The relative loca-
tion and EEZs of the five players are illustrated in figure 2.
In figure 2, the herring fishing area is drawn as a rectangle (box), with each of
the players located at the edges of the box. Note that the EEZs of the players are of
different sizes, with the largest one belonging to Norway. This is not intended to be
geographically accurate,15 but is believed to provide a reasonable approximation of
each player’s actual access to the stock. In the simulations, it is assumed that a
player cannot fish from another player’s EEZs unless they are members of the same
coalition. All players can fish from the high seas.
As discussed above, the migrations of the stock are modelled as a stochastic
process, where the stock moves quarterly from one area of the box to another in a
roughly circular fashion. Each simulation represents one realization of this stochas-
tic process. Averaging over a number of simulations produces a migratory pattern
similar to the one that has been observed.
Figure 2. Relative Location and EEZs of the Five Players (stylized)
14 Simulations were also run assuming that one of the players was more efficient than the others. The
results are noted below.
15 For instance, mature NSS herring never enters the Russian EEZ.Herring Fisheries Games 309
Playing the Game
The game simulations assume, as discussed above, that the players choose their har-
vest volume once every quarter. The game solution algorithm was described in the
Theory section, so that all moves are consistent with Markov perfect equilibria. The
game solution defines a decision rule for each agent—an agent being either a single
nation or a coalition of nations. In the case of coalitions, it is assumed that the play-
ers maximize jointly, including pooling their EEZs. Thus, the game has different so-
lutions depending on the extent of coalitions. Each decision rule prescribes the
amount to be caught by a given agent as a function of the fish stock and its loca-
tion—the state variables of the game. Although, the stock size does not enter the
players’ profit functions explicitly, it imposes an upper bound on the harvest and de-
termines whether the fishery can be profitable. Consequently, for each player this is
a constraint that will have to be taken into account. Since this is a dynamic game, it
follows that the biomass growth constraint has to be taken into account as well. We
take the initial (at the beginning of the game) biomass to be the virgin stock equilib-
rium of some 9.4 million MT. The initial location of the stock is taken to be within
the EEZ of player 1, Norway.
Having found Markov perfect equilibrium decision rules, the game was simu-
lated for a period of 500 quarters (125 years). These simulations were then repeated
25 times, each time using a different seed for the pseudo-random number generator
that generates the migration patterns. The results reported below constitute averages
over these 25 runs. It should be pointed out that this averaging obscures how the
game might evolve in reality, because for some coalition and parameter scenarios
outcomes varied significantly between runs.16 This variation was generated by dif-
ferent migration patterns only, since the rest of the model is deterministic.17
Game Outcomes
The results of the game simulations were generally as expected. The most crucial
outcomes are: (i) player cooperation is needed to save the stock from (near) extinc-
tion, since the competitive game always resulted in the stock being (almost) fully
depleted; (ii) cooperation offers substantially more overall profits than competition;
(iii) the more extensive the cooperation, the higher the profits.
We will now study these outcomes in a little more detail.
The Competitive Game
In spite of its inefficient nature, under our specifications the competitive game
yielded substantial present value of profits to the players. The reason for this is that
the game starts at the virgin stock equilibrium, and good profits can be made by the
initially good catches (see figure 3) as the stock is run down to bioeconomic equilib-
rium where annual profits are virtually zero. Some pertinent numerical outcomes for
the competitive game are listed in table 4.
16 The standard deviation of the net present value of the fisheries to an agent across runs was usually on
the order of 5–20% of the average.
17 Introducing other sources of stochasticity, namely in growth or catches as a function of effort, is actu-
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Figure 3. The Development of Stock and Catches
Under Competitive and Cooperative Games
The Cooperative Game (full cooperation)
Figure 3 compares the harvesting and biomass paths for competition and coopera-
tion, respectively. As expected, full cooperation generated considerably (over three
times) higher net present value of profits than competition. However, even the fully
cooperative solution had the stock being harvested intensively at the outset and
quickly reduced to the long-run optimal level of approximately 4.4 million MT. Af-
ter that, the harvesting continued at approximately the level needed to maintain the
stock, with some variability due to migration. The most pertinent outcomes of the
cooperative game are listed in table 5.
It is worth noting that even in the long run, harvest rates and stock levels fluctu-
ate quite a bit under cooperation, as illustrated in figure 3. This is caused by the
stock migrations. This does two things. First, it affects the profitability of fishing,
since distances affect costs. Second, it prevents full equilibrium from being estab-
lished. Since the migrations are stochastic, the fluctuations are also stochastic.
It may be noticed that the average, long-run stock level under the cooperative
solution is close to the optimal theoretical equilibrium of some 4.2 million MT. The
difference is due to the averaging over 25 stochastically generated migratory paths.
Figure 3 illustrates that under the competitive game, the herring stock is re-
duced must faster than under cooperation. In the long-run, the stock becomes extinct
under competition.
Finally, we should note that the very high initial level of fishing (millions of
MT per quarter) in both the competitive and the cooperative game, requires harvest-
ing and processing capacity that may be in excess of what is actually available. Ag-
gregate capacity constraints were not included in the model. Therefore, these rapidHerring Fisheries Games 311
approach paths to equilibrium may not be feasible. What would more realistically
happen is full utilization of capacity until the neighborhood of equilibrium levels is
reached.18
Cooperation: Payoff to Different Coalitions
For our five players, there is a great variety of different coalitions that can be
formed. Excluding the coalition of one; i.e., the competitive case, twenty-six differ-
ent coalitions are possible—ten, two-player coalitions; ten, three-player coalitions; five,
four-player coalitions; and one five-player coalition.19 Game simulations were run for all
of these possible coalitions for rates of discount of 5% and 10% and the price of the
output of 4 ISK/kg and 6 ISK/kg. For each case, the return (present value of profits)
to each player, the Shapley values each player’s gain from full cooperation (accord-
ing to the Shapley values), and the transfer payment needed to make that gain pos-
sible were calculated.20 Some of these results are summarized in table 6.
Shapley values represent but one possible distribution of the total net profits
available when all agents cooperate to maximize profits. However, the Shapley val-
ues represent a distribution of the benefits that is fair according to quite reasonable crite-
ria (Shapley 1953) and, thus, may be regarded as more acceptable to the players than
some other distribution. The Shapley values, however, should not be interpreted as
the only possible distribution of profits or in any sense a ‘solution’ to the game.
Table 5
The Cooperative Game: Some Outcomes
Rate of discount 5%
Landings price, p = 0.006 M.ISK/ton
Present value of profits (B.ISK.) 12.604
Average long-run stock (million MT) 4.384
Total catch in first two years, million MT 6.906
Average long-run catch (million MT) per year 1.137
Table 4
The Competitive Game: Some Outcomes
Rate of discount 5%
Landings price, p = 0.006 M.ISK/ton
Present value of profits (B.ISK.) 3.972
Average long-run stock (million MT) Negligible
Total catch in first two years, million MT 10.167
Average long-run catch (million MT) Negligible
18 It is not easy to get rid of excess capacity, so the transition to long-term equilibrium may be far from
smooth in practice.
19 The general equation for the number of possible coalitions of any size r from a number of players n is
[ ! !( )!] nr n r
r − ∑ . However, this includes coalitions with a single member and ignores the possibility of
two or more coalitions.
20 See Shapley (1953). A description of how Shapley values are calculated can be found in many ad-
vanced textbooks on Microeconomics or Game Theory. The underlying idea is to find a way to distribute
gains from cooperation equally. The (marginal) contribution of each player to all possible coalitions is
calculated. The average of this contribution for each player is his or her Shapley value.Arnason, Magnusson, and Agnarsson 312
Table 6 lists the calculated payoff (in million ISK) to the players from all pos-
sible (single) coalitions games assuming a landings price of 6 ISK per kg and a rate
of discount of 5% per annum. Also in the table, we report the relevant Shapley val-
ues (for the fully cooperative game) and the necessary transfer payment needed to
give each player his Shapley value under full cooperation. The last column of the
table gives the aggregate payoff to the coalition specified. This, as it stands, is not
very informative. It has to be compared to some alternative. One relevant alternative
(but by no means the only one) is the payoff the coalition members would get under
the competitive game; i.e., the ‘none’ coalition in table 6.
As shown in table 6, the overall benefit of the fishery increases with the size of
the coalitions. This is further illustrated in figure 4, which gives the average (over
all possible coalitions of a given size) total payoff to the game.
Table 6
Results of Game Simulations: Payoffs
Payoff to Individual Participants  (M.ISK)
Player No.
Payoff to
Coalitions 1 2 3 4 5 Total Coalition
None (comp. game) 3,407 50 140 373 4 3,972 0
(2,3) 3,408 71 120 373 4 3,976 191
(1,4) 2,117 148 156 1,949 4 4,374 4,066
(1,3) 1,698 135 1,980 361 8 4,182 3,678
(2,4) 3,408 145 140 284 4 3,981 429
(3,4) 3,624 263 271 444 46 4,647 715
(1,2,4) 1,737 1,198 170 1,481 12 4,599 4,417
(2,3,4) 3,656 293 270 407 62 4,688 970
(1,2,3,4) 2,392 2,185 2,306 2,420 1,963 11,266 9,303
(1,2) 1,623 2,001 118 413 3 4,157 3,624
(1,3,4) 1,768 359 1,527 1,482 99 5,235 4,777
(1,2,3) 1,082 1,590 1,282 409 14 4,377 3,954
(2,3,5) 3,742 191 200 577 147 4,857 538
(1,4,5) 2,028 309 203 1,690 1,122 5,352 4,840
(1,3,5) 1,414 437 1,460 498 1,262 5,072 4,136
(2,4,5) 3,742 276 234 424 192 4,868 892
(3,4,5) 3,743 308 241 406 160 4,858 807
(1,2,4,5) 1,875 1,080 332 1,391 901 5,578 5,246
(2,3,4,5) 3,754 275 255 394 208 4,886 1,132
(1,2,3,4,5) 2,701 2,583 2,645 2,607 2,069 12,605 12,605
(1,2,5) 1,623 2,001 118 413 3 4,158 3,627
(1,3,4,5) 1,633 360 1,370 1,249 961 5,572 5,213
(1,2,3,5) 935 1,554 1,125 613 1,171 5,399 4,786
(1,5) 2,074 295 234 565 1,818 4,985 3,892
(2,5) 3,742 184 234 564 121 4,845 305
(3,5) 3,743 295 167 564 72 4,841 239
(4,5) 3,743 296 234 445 127 4,844 572
Shapley values 5,554 1,856 1,958 2,339 897
Transfer payments
     needed 2,853 –727 –687 –268 –1,172
Total gain from
     cooperation 2,148 1,806 1,819 1,966 894
Note: Rate of discount 5%, Price = 6.Herring Fisheries Games 313
Figure 4. Aggregate Payoffs as a Function of Coalitions
Stability of Coalitions
Without side payments, relatively few coalitions seem to be stable in the sense that
each player benefits from participating compared to what he could expect in the
competitive case. More precisely, for the case in table 6 (β  = 0.95 and price = 6 ISK/
kg), only 10 out of 26 coalitions have this property.
It is particularly interesting to note that Norway cannot be induced to enter a
coalition without side payments. This also implies that without side payments the
grand coalition, the coalition of all players, is not stable. If side payments are pos-
sible, the picture changes drastically. In that case, the grand coalition seems quite
stable. On average, it yields almost three times the aggregate benefits of the com-
petitive case and about 12% more than the best alternative coalition (1,2,3,4). If the
benefits from the grand coalition are allocated according to the Shapley value crite-
rion, the country that gains least in percentage terms compared to the competitive
case; i.e., Norway, still increases its net benefits by over 60%. All the other nations
receive several times more than they could expect under competition. More impor-
tantly, all countries receive much more than they would be able to obtain from any
other stable coalition without side payments. Thus, assuming the appropriate side
payments, it is to the advantage of no one to block the grand coalition.
For achieving of economic efficiency in the Atlanto-Scandian herring fishery,
the participation of Norway in a cooperative utilization arrangement seems to be
crucial. This, however, does not seem to be possible without side payments. Hence,
the possibility of side payments seems to be the key to efficiency in this fishery.
It may seem peculiar that Norway, the largest player, requires side payments to
participate in the grand coalition, and that all the other players would benefit from
paying this compensation. There are two main reasons for this result. The first is
that Norway is uniquely placed in this game. Not only does it have by far the largest
fisheries jurisdiction, but it also has exclusive access to the stock following spawn-
ing. Thus, as shown in table 6, with a relatively large initial stock, Norway can ob-
tain substantial economic benefits from the fishery in the competitive game as well
as in the game against the coalition of all the other players. The second reason is
that the optimal cooperative solution to the game—the one that maximizes overall
benefits—involves, by definition, no exclusive national access to the stock; i.e., in
effect a joint EEZ. As a result, the catch levels are reasonably equal between the
players. Thus, under this arrangement, the smaller players gain a great deal com-
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other hand, loses compared to what it would obtain without cooperation. For this
reason, a substantial side payment to Norway paid by all the other players is re-
quired for the grand coalition to be stable. The Shapley values give one particular
option for the size of these payments.
Altered Conditions
Several simulations were run with some of the conditions of the game altered. In
particular, we investigated the effect of varying the relative economic efficiency of
the national fishing fleets and altering the relative size of the national EEZs. It may
be noted that the latter may also be taken to represent a shift in the migratory pattern
of the Atlanto-Scandian herring.
Although the outcomes of these different cases vary in detail, they exhibit the
same qualitative characteristics as described above. More importantly, the more ex-
tensive cooperation between the players, the higher the aggregate present value of
profits and the equilibrium stock level. What changes, however, is the stability of
particular coalitions and the distribution of benefits of cooperation between the vari-
ous players.
An extensive account of these additional runs is outside the scope of this paper.
Therefore, we only provide a few sample results pertaining to the grand coalition.
These results, listed in table 7, should be compared to the grand coalition base case
reported in table 6.
The results in table 7 list the individual and aggregate payoffs before and after
side payments (transfer payments) under the grand coalition for conditions altered in
three different ways. The first section reports on the payoffs assuming player 1, Nor-
way, is 20% more efficient (20% higher net profits per unit of harvest) than the
other players. This leads to an increase both in the aggregate payoff and the gain
from cooperation compared to the base case. At the same time, according to the
Shapley value calculations, most, but not all, of the added benefits go to the more
efficient operator, Norway.
The second case reports on the aggregate payoffs assuming that the EEZs of
players 1 and 2 are equal. All the other EEZs and the extent of the high seas are un-
changed. This means, that the EEZ of player 2, Iceland, is increased at the cost of
player 1, Norway. This is equivalent to assuming that on its migratory routes, the herring
now spend the same amount of time in the Icelandic and Norwegian EEZs as seems to
have been the case in the 1950s and 1960s. In this case, the aggregate payoff to the
grand coalition is unchanged, but the distribution of the benefits, according to the
Shapley values, tilts substantially toward Iceland, compared to the base case.
The third case in table 7 reports on the case where the landings price is reduced
by one-third (from 6 ISK/kg) to (4 ISK/kg). The main impact of this is to reduce the
aggregate payoff from the grand coalition by about 58% and the individual payoffs
proportionately.
Finally, we may mention that altering the discount rate, just as altering the price
of landings, primarily affects the aggregate and individual payoffs but does not affect the
overall tenor of results under the grand coalitions or the distribution of the benefits.
Discussion
The above analysis of the Atlanto-Scandian herring fishery is based on quite a
simple empirical description of the fishery—a description that is more properly re-
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numerical results reported should be regarded as indicative only. The qualitative na-
ture of the results, on the other hand, is probably more reliable. First of all, they are
very much along the lines predicted by theory. Secondly, they are in good conform-
ance with the game, as it seems to have been played hitherto by the nations in-
volved.
Perhaps the most striking result of the paper is the difficulty in establishing
stable coalitions for this fishing game unless side payments between the players are
possible. There are ample incentives to reach agreement, however, since the coop-
erative solution generates far higher aggregate profits than other solutions. Side pay-
ments may take various forms. Monetary payments will, of course, do the trick, and
it is implicitly assumed in this paper that side payments are monetary. Perhaps a
more acceptable method is to allow certain players selective access to other players’
EEZs. As is well known, such agreements are often seen in practice.
The game simulations reported on do not cover some pertinent aspects of the ac-
tual game situation. Among the more interesting aspects of the game omitted in the
paper, but perfectly feasible to analyze within the model are (i) the possibility of en-
try by new players and (ii) the question of time consistency of whatever cooperative
agreement is reached.
Table 7
Altered Conditions: Simulation Results
Direct Transfer Shapley Gain from
Profit Payment Value Cooperation
Case 1
Player 1 20% More Efficient
Player 1 4,035 2,025 6,061 1,939
Player 2 2,286 –388 1,898 1,898
Player 3 2,501 –529 1,971 1,971
Player 4 2,545 –110 2,434 2,434
Player 5 1,887 –997 890 890
Sum 13,254 0 13,254 9,132
Case 2
EEZ of Players 1 and 2 Equal
Player 1 2,709 –107 2,601 1,862
Player 2 2,582 31 2,613 1,858
Player 3 2,648 –244 2,404 1,658
Player 4 2,597 –270 2,327 1,581
Player 5 2,069 591 2,659 1,915
Sum 12,605 0 12,605 8,874
Case 3
Price of Landings 4 ISK/kg
Player 1 1,710 1,506 3,216 1,238
Player 2 1,479 –409 1,070 1,049
Player 3 1,516 –371 1,146 1,058
Player 4 1,610 –256 1,354 1,143
Player 5 987 –470 517 515
Sum 7,303 0 7,303 5,002
Note: Amounts in M. ISK.Arnason, Magnusson, and Agnarsson 316
Under the UN agreement on high-seas fishing (United Nations 1995), interested
fishing nations must be included in regional fisheries agreements. This potentially
opens the door for new nations to enter once cooperation between the current fishing
nations has rebuilt the stocks and enhanced the profitability of the fishery. Clearly,
this threat will affect the optimal game strategies of existing players. A way to
model this within the framework of the current model is to define a less efficient ad-
ditional player that can enter profitably once the stock has exceeded a certain size or
the migratory behavior of the stock has become sufficiently favorable.
To be dynamically stable or time consistent, any cooperative agreement must at
all times provide the parties with an expected present value in excess of what he
could get by leaving the coalition. In the case of the Atlanto-Scandian herring fish-
ery, the evolution of the stock variables over time will generally alter the players’
threat points and, thus, potentially destabilize a previously stable cooperative agree-
ment. This aspect of the game can also be analyzed within the framework of the
model. What is needed is essentially a calculation of the necessary side payments or
Shapley values over time. With significantly variable conditions, it may be that a
necessary component of a stable cooperative agreement is dynamic sharing of the
aggregate payoff depending on the state of the fishery.
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Appendix
Derivation of the Fishing Time and Fishing Trips Equations
Consider a fishing vessel. Its instantaneous rate of harvest may be written as
yt Fxt kt t ()= [ () , () ] () ⋅φ (A1)
where y(t) represents the rate of harvest, x(t) fish stock biomass, and k(t) vessel charac-
teristics (i.e., capital) all at time t. φ (t) is a shift variable for fishing with φ (t) = 1 when
fishing takes place and φ (t) = 0 otherwise. Equation (A1) is essentially the standard
form of a harvesting function used in fisheries economics (Clark 1976). The only
modification of that theory is the explicit inclusion of the shift parameter φ (t).Arnason, Magnusson, and Agnarsson 318
Over a period of time; e.g., a fishing trip, the accumulated harvest may be writ-
ten as:
y Fxt kt td t Fxt kt t
T
j =⋅ ⋅ ∫ [( ) ,( ) ]  = [( ) ,( ) φ () ]
0
(A2)
where tf represents the fishing time during the period, and x(t) and k(t) must be re-
garded as representing their average values during [0,T]. Alternatively, the time pe-
riod may be regarded as short enough so that x(t) and k(t) may be regarded as con-
stant during the period. For simplicity, we may write equation (A2) as:
ya t j = ⋅ (A3)
where a ≡  F[x(t),k(t)].
In pelagic purse seine fisheries, such as the Atlanto-Scandian herring fishery,
the harvest during the fishing trip is typically limited only by the hold capacity of
the vessel,  y, say. Clearly, in this case:
ty a f =. (A4)
Now, consider a longish period of fishing operations: a month, quarter of a year,
or even a year. Let the length of this period be represented by T. Let the actual fish-
ing time during the period be Tf. Also, let the ineffective time; i.e., the time for sail-
ing from port to the fishing grounds and back, landing the catches and re-supplying
the vessel etc., be represented by Tt. Finally, let delays due major maintenance of the
vessel, bad weather, etc., be a constant fraction of the overall period, b where 0 < b < 1.
Thus,
TTTb T f t =+ + ⋅ (A5)
Note that T – b·T represents what may be called vessel operating time (some-
times measured as days at sea), a statistic that is frequently recorded by fisheries au-
thorities. For future reference write this as:
TT b T T T f t
0 =− ⋅= + . (A6)
Let the ineffective time depend on the number of trips, h, as follows:
Th te ts =⋅ + () (A7)
where ts is the sailing time to and from the fishing grounds and the harbor, and e is
the landing and resupplying time each trip.
The sailing time clearly depends on the distance to the fishing grounds, d.
td s s =⋅ 2( ) (A8)
where s represents the sailing speed of the vessel.
The number of trips, on the other hand, is:
hT b t te f s =( + + ) . ⋅ (–) 1 (A9)Herring Fisheries Games 319
Combining equations (A7) and (A9) yields:
TT bte tte ts f s =( + + ) . ⋅−⋅ + () ( ) 1 (A10)
Therefore, in view of equations (A5), (A6), and (A10), the overall fishing time is
given by:




ff s =( + + ) = ⋅− + [] ⋅+ + [] 1( ) ( ) (A11)
Now, substituting in for tf , To and ts from equations (A4), (A6), and (A8), re-
spectively, we find:
TT b y a y a d s e f =⋅−⋅ + ⋅ + [] () ( ) 12 (A12)
=⋅−⋅ + ⋅⋅ + [] Tb y y a d s e ()( ( ) 12
According to this equation, total fishing time is a declining function of distance, and
the catch rate, a, increasing vessel speed, s, and vessel hold capacity,  y. Moreover,
in accordance with intuition, as  y approaches infinity, there is only one fishing trip,
and fishing time reaches an upper limit of T·(1 – b). The same applies when the rate
of catch, a, goes to zero. If distance to the fishing grounds, d, is zero, fishing time is
Tf = T·(1 – β )·[ y/( y  + a·e)]. However, when distance goes to infinity, fishing time
converges to zero, as intuition also suggests.
Finally, the number of trips, h, is given by h = Tf /tf. Hence, by equation (A4):
hTa y f = ⋅ (A13)
Therefore, it follows from equations (A12) and (A13) that:
hT ba ya d se =⋅−⋅ + ⋅⋅ + [] {} () ( ) . 12 (A14)